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Abstract
The paper analyzes the welfare impacts of alternative sequencing
scenarios of  agricultural market reforms in Malawi using a profit maximization
approach. The simulation results show that, contrary to the sequencing path
adopted in the 1980's, Malawi's Government should have liberalized the maize
sector first, followed by the groundnut export sector, and once a supply response
was generated, input subsidies could have been phased out, without generating
a negative impact on producers' welfare and food security.
The Sequencing of Agricultural Market Reforms in Malawi
1. Introduction
In many developing countries, where most smallholder farmers are food
insecure and poor, it is crucial to adopt a sequence of agricultural market reform
policies that minimize the short-run costs of liberalization and provide a minimum
of safety net for the farmer. Otherwise, many farmers may not be able to
withstand the shock of adjustment, or may loose their support for market reforms
and the structural adjustment programs. One country which provides a good
example on the importance of implementing an appropriate sequence of market
reforms, is Malawi.  Harrigan (1988) argues that poorly sequenced input and
output price policies in the 1980's were a major cause of the failure of some of
the reform programs in Malawi. For example, she notes that poor sequencing
was evident in the removal of input subsidies in advance of maize producer price
increases, and in export crop price liberalization in advance of staple food crop
liberalization. Harrigan also points out that there was a conflict between the
donors' emphasis on export diversification and commercialization, and the
government's concern with food self-sufficiency, resulting in inadequately
sequenced input and output price policies.
This paper evaluates the welfare impacts of alternative sequencing
scenarios of agricultural market reforms in Malawi. It attempts to determine
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whether Malawi's government should have liberalized the staple crop sub-sector
before or after the export sub-sector, and whether it should have deregulated
agricultural output markets before input markets.  It is the first study that derives
quantitative results to support policy recommendations regarding the sequencing
of agricultural market reforms.  In the following section we review the literature
on sequencing of market reforms. In Section 3 we describe the agricultural
sector in Malawi.  The sequencing of agricultural reforms in Malawi is
summarized in Section 4. Section 5 explains the profit maximization model we
use to analyze the alternative sequencing scenarios. The empirical model is
estimated in section 6. In section 7, the simulation results are analyzed, and the
conclusions are presented in Section 8.
2. Sequencing of Market Reforms: A Review of the Literature
The question of what is the "optimal" speed and sequencing of market
reforms is a source of debate in the development literature. Because of the
failure of some structural adjustment programs in Africa and the difficult
transition that countries of the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are
facing, many economists are attempting to formulate an appropriate sequence
for monetary, fiscal, trade, and micro-sectoral policy reforms. Two important
branches of thought have emerged from this research. The first school of
thought argues either for a big bang approach where all sectors are liberalized
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simultaneously (Sachs and Woo 1994), or it argues that sequencing does not
matter as long as the government is committed to a set of credible and
sustainable market reform measures (McPherson 1995). Economists that adhere
to this approach believe that there is no "optimal" sequence of economic reform
mainly because: a) successful reform is dependent on the special circumstances
and the economic structure of the country, and therefore there are no
generalizable recipes for successful reform (Sachs and Woo 1994), and b) 
there is no theoretical basis for deriving an "optimal" reform path (McPherson
1995).
Most economists on the other side of the debate advise for a gradual
approach to liberalization, especially in countries witnessing large market
rigidities, resource distortions, and macro-economic instability (Edwards
(1992a), Rana (1995)). The advise for a gradualistic approach rather than shock
therapy is based on lower short-term adjustment costs and smaller political
opposition (Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), Choksi and Papageorgiou (1986),
and Michaely (1986)). Based on the trade policy experience in Latin America for
example, McKinnon (1973, 1982, 1991), Frenkel (1982, 1983), and Edwards
(1986, 1987, 1992a,b) find that the behavior of the exchange rate is extremely
important and therefore that the current account should be liberalized before the
capital account to prevent an overvaluation of the real exchange rate.  Edwards
argues also that to prevent capital flight, international capital controls should be
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eliminated only after reforming the domestic financial markets, and that interest
rates should not be raised until after the fiscal deficit is under control. These are
only "rule-of-thumb" recommendations for trade reform because the
successfulness of reform also depends on the initial conditions in the country
and the type of domestic policies adopted. 
The difference in the sequencing of reforms is seen as an important
reason for the relatively greater success of the transitional economies of Asia
than of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Rana 1995).  The Asian
approach involved the implementation of micro economic reforms earlier than
that of macro and trade reforms.  In contrast, in some Eastern European
countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Slovania, the "big bang"
approach was adopted while in some other countries, such as Hungary and
Romania, reforms were implemented starting with macroeconomic reforms first. 
The Asia approach typically involved implementing price reform, agrarian reform,
and industrial enterprise reform earlier than the implementation of fiscal,
monetary, and foreign trade reforms. According to Rana, the Asian experience
indicates the importance of the development of market oriented institutions as a
first step in market reforms, and the implementation of gradual reforms over
"shock therapy", starting preferably with microeconomic liberalization rather than
macroeconomic reform.
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Although there has been an abundance of research on the appropriate
sequencing of trade policy, and whether macro-economic stabilization measures
should precede sectoral liberalization efforts, not many economists have
examined the issue of the sequencing of market reforms within the agricultural
sector.  There are three types of market reform sequencing programs that have
a direct influence on the agricultural sector. The first one is macro-sectoral
policy sequencing which tries to determine whether macroeconomic reforms
should precede agricultural sector reform. It is now well documented that
macroeconomic policy reform alone is not enough to get an economy back on its
feet and that sectoral reform may be useless if it is not accompanied by trade,
monetary, and fiscal policy reforms. The second type of agricultural sequencing
pertains to the appropriate sequence of liberalization along the agricultural
marketing channel.  The question here is whether retail markets should be
liberalized before wholesale or external trade markets. The third type of
agricultural sector sequencing question asks i) whether input markets should be
liberalized before output markets, and ii) whether staple crops should be
liberalized before export crops. 
Some non-quantitative research has analyzed a few of these issues.
Valdés (1993) discusses the outcomes of alternative sequencing scenarios of
macroeconomic and sectoral reforms pursued by the governments of Chile and
New Zealand. Valdés emphasizes the importance of the real exchange rate and
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the need to quickly privatize agricultural input and output markets following
international trade liberalization.  Booth (1991) argues that bad timing and
sequencing of different reforms are considered important factors in explaining
the poor performance of structural adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
He points out that the lack of coordination between different elements of the
structural adjustment programs (such as macro and agriculture) is one of the
major factors for poor supply response in Sub-Saharan agriculture.  Although
Booth agrees that a single optimal sequence of reforms can not be suggested
for all the developing countries, he believes that common principles can be
applied in formulating policy reform.  For example, he suggests that one should
avoid big delays between the liberalization of foreign trade and exchange rate
markets and the removal of restrictions on internal marketing and price fixing
arrangements. Ahmed (1995) examines Bangladesh's agricultural input market
reform and concludes that liberalization should start in retail markets and move
up along the marketing chain to wholesale and external markets.  The reasoning
behind this recommendation is that the public sector is usually more efficient at
the top of the marketing channel than at the bottom, and that the degree of
competition of the private sector is much higher in retail markets than in
wholesale or external markets. 
Thompson (1991) finds that if agricultural crops are close substitutes then
it is preferable to liberalize all output prices simultaneously to prevent
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undesirable substitution between crops. Thompson also agrees that reform is
more likely to be successful if it starts from the consumer level, mainly because
there would be less pricing inconsistencies.  Duncan and Jones (1993) and the
1994 FAO study on the structural adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan Africa,
argue that  input and output markets should be liberalized prior to the complete
removal of government involvement, because government intervention may be
needed at least in the early stages of liberalization.  The response to reforms by
the private sector is more rapid when appropriate market conditions exist such
as an already functioning private sector, access to credit and foreign exchange,
high seasonal demand, national security, and a policy framework favorable to
private participation.  The FAO study recommends the liberalization of domestic
financial markets prior to the produce markets, and the liberalization of output
markets before input markets in order to reduce the short-term structural
problems that small farmers may face in procuring inputs from private channels.  
The results of most of these studies underline the importance of the
sequencing of agricultural market reforms for the success of liberalization. The
short-run impacts of different sequencing scenarios are important because the
ability of many developing countries to absorb the costs of adjustment are very
limited.  This is especially true for many poor African countries which rely on one
or two commodities for most of their foreign exchange earnings, which are not
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politically stable, and where external shocks are quite frequent such as severe
droughts. 
3. The Agricultural Sector in Malawi 
Malawi's economy is heavily dependent on the agricultural sector. More
than 85% of Malawi's population resides in rural areas and 80% of its total labor
force works in agriculture. The agricultural sector generates around 90% of the
country's foreign exchange earnings.  Agricultural GDP provides approximately
35% of Malawi's total GDP and is divided into two sub-sectors: the estate sub-
sector which produces about 20% of the agricultural GDP and the smallholder
sector which produces the remaining 80%.  Estate land occupies around 12% of
arable land, the rest is used by smallholders, the majority of which (55%) have
farms of less than 1 ha in size (Harvard Institute for International Development,
1994).  The growth of the agricultural sector has been very sluggish, increasing
at about 1.6% per year from 1980 to 1994, which is about half the population
growth rate (The World Bank 1995). The dual nature of the agricultural sector
has been reinforced by (i) discrimination against the smallholders with respect to
choice of crops, access to inputs and marketing opportunities, and (ii) by
allowing the estate sector to freely produce and market its products.
The estate sub-sector in Malawi produces mainly export crops including
tobacco, tea, and sugar which constitute around 95% of total agricultural
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exports. Since 1980, burley tobacco has dominated expansion of the estate sub-
sector. Estate farmers also produce a limited quantity of food-crops such as
maize and groundnuts, but mainly for home consumption. Smallholders, who
constitute the majority of rural residents, grow mainly maize for subsistence.
Maize production constitutes more than two-third of the total smallholder
agricultural production. In most years, Malawi is self-sufficient in maize, and
could even export maize, but the frequent occurrence of droughts limits Malawi's
ability to rely every year on its own production to meet domestic demand.
Smallholders are therefore constantly facing food insecurity accentuated by
increasing land pressure and declining farm size (Govindan and Babu 1996).
Other crops grown by smallholders are groundnuts, cassava, rice, millet,
sorghum, beans, and a few cash crops such as tobacco, tea and cotton.  Inter-
cropping is common and most agriculture production is rainfed which
accentuates the devastating effects of the drought.  There is only one growing
rainy season per year which extends from November until March.  All fertilizers
used in Malawi are imported and the government has been encouraging the use
of high analysis fertilizer to save on transport and foreign exchange costs. 
According to the World Bank (1995), less than 45% of all smallholders use
fertilizers, mainly due to low income, small land holding size, and poor access to
credit.
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4. History of Market Reforms in Malawi
Prior to 1981, smallholder agricultural production and marketing in Malawi
were heavily controlled by the government.  Smallholder farmers were not
allowed to grow burley or flue-cured tobacco, tea, or sugar. The parastatal, the
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), distributed
inputs to and purchased output from smallholder farmers at guaranteed fixed
prices, announced prior to the planting season (Harrigan 1988).   Maize
producer prices were set between a regional export parity price and the import
parity price.  The difference between these two prices was quite significant due
to the large transportation costs to and from Malawi. Input prices were also
subsidized which contributed to the leakage of smallholder subsidized inputs to
the estate sector. On the other hand, export crops such as cotton, tobacco, and
groundnuts were heavily taxed.  Producer prices were raised every few years but
in a very ad-hoc manner. Figures 1 and 2, and Table A, show that real maize
prices were quite erratic while groundnut real prices witnessed a downward
trend until 1982. 
In response to severe external shocks and resulting macro-economic
imbalances, Malawi embarked in 1981 on a series of structural adjustment and
macro-economic stabilization programs supported by donor organizations. To
meet the conditionalities of these programs, Malawi adopted a flexible exchange
rate policy, attempted to restructure its parastatals, and moved slowly towards
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liberalizing its price and marketing policies, especially in the agricultural sector.
From 1984 to 1987, nominal maize prices remained fixed resulting in declining
real maize prices while considerable price increases were implemented for
smallholder export crops, until they almost reached parity level. Therefore,
pressured by the structural adjustment programs, parity pricing for exportable
crops occurred in advance of liberalization of the market for food crops. This
combined effect led farmers to shift production out of improved maize and into
groundnuts. In 1987, the country ended up with a large maize deficit and a
groundnut surplus (see figures 3 and 4). In addition, in order to reduce the drain
on the government budget and halt ADMARC's financial problems, the
government adopted in 1983 the fertilizer subsidy removal program (FSRP)
which was designed to gradually phase out fertilizer subsidies.  Consequently, at
the same time that fertilizers prices were liberalized, smallholder maize prices
remained fixed resulting in a severe loss in relative gross margins for
smallholders. Table 1 presents a summary of the agricultural policy changes that
occurred from 1981 until the present.
In 1986, Malawi's economy deteriorated due to falling tobacco and tea
export prices, severe droughts, and the cut-off of transport routes through
Mozambique.  In 1987, a new series of World Bank programs and loans were
initiated.  In the agricultural sector, this meant freeing smallholder output
markets for all crops except for cotton and tobacco.  However, although private
12
trading was allowed, producer prices were still fixed by the Government. Maize
producer prices were raised by 36% in the 1987/88 cropping season and area
and production of smallholder hybrid maize more than doubled while production
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Figure 1. Maize Prices in Malawi, 1967-93
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Table 1 : Agricultural Policy Changes in Malawi 1981-1996
Year Government Policy Changes Effect on Fertilizer, Maize, and Groundnut Prices
Prior to Smallholder production and Subsidization of smallholder inputs;
1981 marketing controlled by ADMARC Guaranteed maize producer prices; 
Taxation of export crop prices such as groundnuts.
1981- -Structural adjustment and Slow move towards flexible exchange rate policy,
1986 stabilization programs: Export restructuring of parastatals, and progressive
diversification and liberalization of agricutural pricing and marketing
promotion strategy; policies;
-Initiation of the Fertilizer Subsidy Constant nominal maize prices,  liberalization of
Removal Program (FSRP). groundnut export prices. Gradual decrease in
smallholder fertilizer subsidies;
1986- Deterioration of the economy Large maize deficit and groundnut surplus; 
1987 (drought, war in Mozambique, Falling profit margins for smallholders.
falling tobacco and tea export
prices)
1987- New structural adjustment - Liberalization of output markets for all crops except
1993 programs and loans cotton and tobacco;
 - FSRP suspended: increase in fertilizer subsidies;
- Increase in the maize to groundnut relative real price
ratio.
1993- Further market reforms Resumption of the FSRP (fertilizer subsidy eliminated
1996 by 1995/96);
Liberalization of maize seed production and
marketing;
Crop prices set free expect for maize price band; 
Private sector allowed to trade freely in agricultural
input and output markets but ADMARC still dominant
player.
addition, between 1991 and 1993, the government imposed a ban on private
groundnut exports because ADMARC was not able to compete with the private
sector. 
On the input side, the aggregate rate of fertilizer subsidization fell from
30.5% in 1983/84 to 19.8% to 1987/88 (World Bank). However, by 1987,
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fertilizer subsidies were resumed because the government did not want to
burden smallholders with sharply rising fertilizer costs resulting from escalating
transport costs and devaluation of the Kwacha.  By 1988/89, fertilizer subsidy
rates had increased by 50% (see figure 5). In May 1993, a policy was
announced to open up smallholder fertilizer markets (both imports and
distribution) to the private sector. In 1993/94, the FSRP resumed and resulted in
a 11% subsidy rate in 1994, a 5% subsidy rate in 1994/95, and a 0% subsidy
rate in 1995/96. However, in the 1995/96 growing season, emergency relief seed
and fertilizer bags were distributed freely to almost 40% of smallholders due to
the severe drought of the previous year. Production and marketing of hybrid
seed maize was liberalized in 1995/96.
Since April 1995, all input and output prices were set free except for a
maize price band.  ADMARC sets maize floor prices for smallholders and a
ceiling price for consumers, and maize exports are prohibited unless national
requirements are met.  Private traders are allowed to trade freely within the price
band and ADMARC acts as buyer of last resort for staple food crops as well as
manager of strategic reserves. ADMARC has been implementing a divestiture
program and has been closing uneconomic markets, nevertheless, it is still the
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Figure 6.  Fertilizer Use in Malawi, 1967-93
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5. The Profit Maximization Model
The objective of the model is to compare the producer welfare effects of
different agricultural market reform sequencing scenarios. We assume that
smallholder farmers want to maximize profits over time, given their expectations
about government input and output price policies. The profit maximization model
focuses only on the smallholder sector because smallholder farmers produce
most of the agricultural products in Malawi, and because they are the main
target of the agricultural market reform efforts.  The two most important
competing crops in the smallholder sector are maize and groundnuts. Maize and
groundnuts generate around 90% of the total revenues of smallholder agriculture
and they absorb more than 90% of total smallholder input use.  Therefore, to
simplify the profit maximization model, we concentrate on these two crops and
on the two most widely used inputs, fertilizer and labor. We also assume that
land is a binding constraint and that the representative farmer wants to maximize
his discounted stream of profits over time. For simulation purposes, we use a
time horizon of three years so that we can simulate the impact of the sequential
liberalization of maize, groundnut, and fertilizer prices on total profits.  That is
the farmer maximizes:
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where * refers to the discount factor, and B  , B  , and B  are the farmer'st   t+1    t+2
profits in periods t, t+1, and t+2.  From theory, we know that maximizing A is
equivalent to maximizing B , *B  , and *  B  separately.  Therefore thet  t+1   2 t+2
maximization problem is reduced to the following:
for k=t, t+1, or t+2, and where p  and p  are the expected prices of maize andm   g
k  k
groundnuts in period k, y  and y  are the desired maize and groundnutm   g
k  k
quantities produced at time k, p  and w  are the fertilizer prices and wage ratesf   l
k  k
in period k, x  and  x  are the quantities of fertilizers and labor used in thef    l
k   k
production of maize and groundnuts at time k, and z is a vector of fixed inputs
quantities or shift variables.  
Substituting the solution to the maximization problem (2) in the profit
function yields the indirect profit function, B , which is a function of the following*
variables:  
In order to empirically estimate the changes in the producers' profits due
to changes in policies, we need to specify a functional form for the profit
function.  An appropriate functional form for the present study is the normalized
B B/wl a0 E
i
a i pi 1/2E
i,j
bij pi pj E
i,n
bin pi zn
for i, j m, g, f ; with bij bji
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(4)
quadratic function which allows us to estimate jointly the maize and groundnut
supply functions, and the fertilizer and labor demand functions.  The normalized
quadratic functional form has been used in previous multiproduct supply and
input demand models (see Shumway (1983), Bapna et al. (1984), Bautista
(1986), and Shumway et al. (1988) among others).  One of the major advantages
of this functional form is that it allows us to derive a system of linear output
supply and input demand equations with appropriate theoretical restrictions. 
This permits us to estimate directly the impact of price changes on the output
supply, input demand, and profit levels.  With such a system, linear homogeneity
with respect to prices is imposed and one of the input prices can be used as a
numéraire to normalize the profit and price variables.  If we choose the wage
rate as the numéraire, the profit function in equation (3) can be specified as
follows:
where a , a , and b  are parameters to be estimated,  p  = p  / w  and p  = p  / w0  i   ij       i   i  l  j   j  l
*      *
are the normalized prices for either maize, groundnuts, or fertilizers, and z refers
to the remaining structural variables.  By the envelope theorem, the output
supply and input demand equations can be derived as functions of the
ym am bmm(pm/wl) bmg(pg/wl) bmf(pf/wl) bmwW bmaA ,m
yg ag bgm(pm/wl) bgg(pg/wl) bgf(pf/wl) bgwW bgaA bgdD ,g
xf af bfm(pm/wl) bfg(pg/wl) bff (pf/wl) bfwW bfaA ,f
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(5)
normalized input and output prices and the level of fixed inputs and shift
variables:
where W is weather measured by a dummy to distinguish drought years, A is the
land area under maize and groundnuts, D is a dummy to take account of a
sudden upward shift in groundnut supply response from 1982 to 1987 (see figure
4), and ,  is the error term. To estimate the above system of equations, we usei
Zellner's generalized least squares method.  The labor demand equation is
dropped from the system because the wage rate is used to normalize other
prices. The estimated equations yield the predicted values of output supplies
and input demands.  For the specific periods of interest, t and t+1, and t+2, the
predicted values of  output supplies and input demands can be calculated using
the relevant data and estimated parameters.   Different sequencing options for
market reform are incorporated through changes in output and input prices.  The
predicted values of output supplies and input demands can then be obtained for
the different sequencing scenarios.  The difference between the predicted
values corresponding to the reference period and those obtained from the
changes in price policies indicate the possible responses in output supplies and
Own price elasticities: 0ii bii (pi / yi)
0ll E
n 1
j 1 0lj , i … j, l
Cross price elasticities: 0ij bij (pj / yi)
0lj (p j / wl xl) E
n 1
i 1 bij pi
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(6)
input demands.  Similarly, the predicted values of quasi rents can be obtained by
incorporating appropriate changes in prices in equation (4). 
The estimated parameters can also be used to derive the output supply
and input demand elasticities through the following expressions:
where 0  and 0  refer to own and cross-price elasticities of maize supply,ii  ij
groundnut supply, and fertilizer demand, and 0  and 0  refer to own and cross-ll  lj
price elasticities of labor demand.  
6.  Data Description
The output supply and input demand equations are estimated for
Malawian smallholder agriculture using annual data from 1967 to 1993 (see
Table A).  The data on crop prices and production as well as labor use are
available from the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Development (MOALD) and
from the Malawi Agricultural Statistics Annual Bulletin, 1993 (Government of
Malawi (GOM), 1993).  Fertilizer use and prices as well as wages are from
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Mosley (1993).  All prices are converted to 1970 constant prices by using the
Consumer Price Index as the deflator.  Data on labor and wages are not
available for the period 1991-1993, and therefore we extrapolate estimates for
these years.
7.  Empirical Results and Policy Simulations   
The results of the estimation of the system of output supply and input
demand equations are presented in Table 2. The parameters maintain the
symmetry and homogeneity restrictions.  The explanatory power of the equations
varies from an adjusted R  of 0.45 for the maize supply function to an adjusted 2
R  of 0.90 for the groundnut supply equation. The Durbin-Watson statistic2
ranges from 1.34 to 1.88.   More than 60% of all the estimated parameters are
significant at the 1% level and all the parameters have the expected signs.  The
dummy for the drought years is significantly negative indicating that drought did
have an important negative impact on maize and groundnut production during
the years 1980, 1981 and 1992.  In the groundnut equation, we notice that the
dummy for 1982-87 is positive and significant, which supports the fact that, apart
from prices, government policies during this period caused a positive shift in
groundnut production.  The land area variable has a positive and significant
influence on output supplies and input demand.
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The elasticities computed at the sample means are presented in Table 3.
The estimated own-price elasticity for maize is 0.26, which is consistent with
previous studies on Malawi (Govindan and Babu 1996).  The own-price elasticity
for groundnuts is estimated as 1.20. The cross-price elasticities of maize and
groundnuts with respect to each other indicate that both crops are substitutes in
nature.  The output supply elasticities with respect to input prices are negative
as expected.  The own price elasticities for fertilizer and labor demand are
estimated at -0.23 and -0.15, respectively, consistent with earlier studies on
Malawi (Govindan and Babu 1996) and other developing countries (Sadoulet
and de Janvry 1995).  The negative input cross price elasticities suggest the
substitute nature of inputs used in Malawi agriculture, a pattern also observed in
Argentina, Egypt, and U.S. agriculture (Fulginiti and Perrin 1990).  The
elasticities of input demand with respect to output prices are positive, indicating
that an increase in output price is associated with increased input demand. 
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Table 2.  Parameter Estimates of Output Supply and Input Demand Equations
Dependen Intercept Normalized prices of Area Groundnu




Maize -598.69 2354.30 -27.29 -431.37 -312.23 1.26
supply (550.27) (526.03) (42.27) (85.26) (95.01) (0.42)
Groundnut -52.12 -27.29 86.56 -78.01 -5.39  0.04 47.92
supply (22.24) (42.27) (13.70) (21.87) (3.87) (0.01) (2.62)
Fertilizer  150.40 -431.37 -78.01 70.00 -9.83 -0.09
demand (36.22) (85.26) (21.87) (55.37) (6.23) (0.03)3
Note: Figures in the parentheses are standard errors
Dummy variable used to represent the drought years1 
 Land area under maize and groundnut2
         Input demand is specified in negative units (see last equation in the system3
  of equations (5)) 
Table 3.  Output Supply and Input Demand Elasticities (calculated at the sample
means)
Elasticity of with respect to the price of 
Maize Groundnut Fertilizer Labor
Maize supply 0.26 -0.01 -0.06 -0.19
Groundnut supply -0.12 1.20 -0.43 -0.65
Fertilizer demand 1.09 0.63 -0.23 -1.50
Labor demand 0.17 0.05 -0.07 -0.15
In order to analyze the welfare implications of different price policy
sequencing scenarios on smallholder farmers in Malawi, four different
simulations are conducted.  With the help of predicted values obtained from the
estimation, we can simulate some hypothetical scenarios based on these results. 
The simulations are performed for two different periods to test whether the
results are sensitive to the choice of the period or whether they can be
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generalized despite the rapid changes in the policy environment. The
simulations involve liberalizing the prices of fertilizer, maize, and groundnuts, in
four alternative sequences.  The first period under consideration is 1984 to
1986.  During this period, maize nominal prices were held fixed at 12.2 tb/kg
while fertilizer and groundnut nominal prices were gradually increased in an
attempt to decrease fertilizer subsidies and liberalize export crops for
smallholders.  The deviation between the official producer prices and market
prices for maize is around 25% from 1984-86, and therefore a 25% increase in
maize prices is considered for the simulations of maize market liberalization. 
For groundnuts, official groundnut prices are compared to world market prices
because groundnut is an exported crop.  During 1984-86, the nominal protection
coefficient (NPC) for groundnut was equal to 0.74 (World Bank 1995), which
means that we simulate groundnut market liberalization by a 26% increase in its
price.  The fertilizer subsidy during this same period is estimated at 27% (Sahn
and Van Frausum 1995) and therefore a 27% increase in fertilizer prices is used
to simulate the liberalization of fertilizer markets.
The second period considered is 1987 to 1989.  The deviation between
the official producer price and the market price for maize was close to 25%
during this period.  Hence, the  simulated liberalization for maize involves a 25%
increase in maize prices.  For groundnuts, the NPC declines to 0.66 during
26
1987-89 implying a 34% increase in groundnut price for simulation purposes. 
The fertilizer subsidy during this period is equal to 24% (Sahn and Van Frausum
1995) and therefore we increase fertilizer prices by 24% to simulate its
liberalization.  The four different policy sequencing options that are simulated for
the two periods are presented below:
Simulation 1: In simulation 1, fertilizer prices are liberalized in the first year,
followed by maize market liberalization in the second year, and groundnut price
liberalization in the last year.   The changes in output supplies, input demands,
and quasi rents due to this sequencing of market reforms are presented in the
first set of columns of Tables 4 and 5 for the periods 1984-86 and 1987-89,
respectively.
Simulation 2: For simulation 2, the fertilizer market is liberalized first, followed by
groundnut price liberalization in the second year, and maize market liberalization
in the final year.   The changes in crop supply, fertilizer demand, and quasi rents
are presented in the second set of columns of Tables 4 and 5 for the years
1984-86 and 1987-89.  This simulation follows closely the sequence of price
policies that Malawi adopted in the 1980's.
Simulation 3: In this third simulation, maize markets are liberalized in the first
year.  In the subsequent year, groundnut markets are liberalized, and in the third
year fertilizer markets are liberalized.  The changes in output supplies, input
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demand, and quasi-rents are presented in the third set of columns of  Tables 4
and 5 for the two respective periods.
Simulation 4: In the last simulation, groundnut markets are liberalized in the first
year. In the following year, maize markets are liberalized, and in the last year
fertilizer markets are liberalized.  The changes in supply response and producer
welfare are presented in the last set of columns of Tables 4 and 5 for the two
consecutive periods.
The results of the policy simulations are presented as the percentage
change between the predicted values of the estimated equations and the values
obtained in different simulations.  The results for both periods show that an
increase in fertilizer prices in year 1 (simulations 1 and 2), leads to a decline in
the production of maize and groundnuts, and a decline in the demand for
fertilizers during the initial period. In the second period, when liberalization of
fertilizer prices is followed by maize price liberalization (simulation 1), maize
production increases, groundnut production falls, and the demand for inputs
increases.  On the other hand, if, in the second period, fertilizer liberalization is
followed by groundnut price reform (simulation 2), then maize production
decreases, while groundnut production and input demand increases during that
period.   In the third simulation, the increase in maize prices in year 1, leads to a
rise in maize production, a fall in groundnut production, and an increase in the
demand for fertilizer during that year. Whereas in year 2, when groundnut prices
28
are also liberalized, both crops' outputs increase and the demand for fertilizer
rises.  For the fourth simulation, in year 1, when groundnut prices are liberalized,
maize production falls, groundnut production rises, and input demand increases. 
In year 2, the results are the same as for simulation 3, i.e. both output supply
and input demand rise. 
Notice that in the last year of all four simulations, the impacts on output
supply and input demand are the same, because both maize, groundnut, and
fertilizer prices are liberalized. Therefore, the only difference in the simulation
results is due to the difference in the response of input demands and output
supplies in years 1 and 2, when liberalization is simulated in different
sequences. These findings support the argument that sequencing  is important
for short-run adjustment.
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Table 4.  Results of Policy Simulations for the Period 1984-86 (% change)  
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4
1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986
Maize supply -1.53  4.58  3.83 -1.53 -1.74  3.83  7.09  5.78  3.83 -0.24  5.78  3.83
Groundnut supply -5.36  -5.90  9.11 -5.36 10.28  9.11 -1.59 13.72  9.11 14.61 13.72  9.11
Fertilizer demand -5.93 19.24  34.90 -5.93 11.72 34.90 30.99 41.54 34.90 16.25 41.54  34.90
Quasi Rent (mil K) 38.95 49.07 45.81 38.95 41.66 45.81 49.57 51.93 45.81 41.00 51.93 45.81
Discounted Quasi- 120.22      113.55      133.41      124.84      
Rents (mil K)
Table 5.  Results of Policy Simulations for the Period 1987-89 (% change)
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4
1987 1988 1989 1987 1988 1989 1987 1988 1989 1987 1988 1989
Maize supply -1.61  4.93  6.71 -1.61 -2.20  6.71 5.61 6.39  6.71 -0.42  6.39  6.71
Groundnut supply -4.67 -7.59 36.01 -4.67 15.72 36.01 -1.04 20.40 36.01 21.29 20.40 36.01
Fertilizer demand -5.63 18.04 35.17 -5.63 14.66 35.17 22.08 44.07 35.17 25.77 44.07 35.17
Quasi Rent (mil K) 29.08 35.84 45.25 29.08 29.89 45.25 36.18 38.46 45.25 32.42 38.46 45.25
Discounted Quasi-Rents      97.99      92.63       107.45      103.69 
(mil K)
Simulation 1: Sequence of liberalization: Year 1: fertilizer price; Year 2: maize price; Year 3: groundnut price
Simulation 2: Sequence of liberalization: Year 1: fertilizer price; Year 2: groundnut price; Year 3: maize price
Simulation 3: Sequence of liberalization: Year 1: maize price; Year 2: groundnut price; Year 3: fertilizer price
Simulation 4: Sequence of liberalization: Year 1: groundnut price; Year 2: maize price; Year 3: fertilizer price
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The results in the last year for both periods indicate that the liberalization
of all prices leads to an increase in maize and groundnut production and a rise
in the demand for fertilizers.  The rise in fertilizer prices when crop prices are
liberalized does not induce a decline in fertilizer demand in Malawi.  Various
analyses show that fertilizer use by smallholders is primarily constrained by
inadequate supplies, because fertilizer sales have been increasing despite rising
fertilizer maize price ratios (see figures 5 and 6). 
To calculate the discounted quasi-rents for the three periods, we use a
discount rate of 11%, which is the official discount rate used by the Government
of Malawi.  The comparison of the discounted quasi-rents for the four different
sequencing scenarios shows that simulation 3 leads to the largest quasi-rents
(133 million Kwacha (K) and 107 million K for the periods 1984-86 and 1987-89
respectively). This means that maize market liberalization followed by groundnut
market liberalization and later by fertilizer price reform leads to a higher welfare
for producers.  The next best alternative is simulation 4, where discounted quasi-
rents for the two periods in question are equal to 125 million K and 104 million K,
and where again output prices are liberalized before input prices, but groundnut
price reform precedes maize price reform.  The worst scenario is where fertilizer
subsidies are removed first followed by the liberalization of groundnut prices and
then the liberalization of maize prices (Simulation 2), which is exactly the
sequence that the government opted for during the period 1984-86.  This
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scenario leads to the lowest discounted quasi-rent for both periods (114 million
K and 93 million K).  Simulation 1 - where fertilizer prices are liberalized first but
where maize price liberalization precedes that of groundnuts - leads to higher
profits than simulation 2, but generates lower income than simulations 3 and 4
where input prices are liberalized last.  
The simulation results presented above support Harrigan's findings that
staple food crop prices ought to have been liberalized first in Malawi, followed by
export crop prices, and finally by input prices. To promote an adequate and least
cost response, the government should have freed maize prices first allowing the
farmers to increase their supply response and secure enough food for
themselves.  This should have been followed by groundnut price liberalization to
increase cash income, and then once farmers can increase their food security
and cash income, the government could have more easily liberalized fertilizer
prices without causing an adverse effect on production. By liberalizing fertilizer
prices first, the government squeezed the margin of profit of the farmers with no
compensatory mechanisms, which resulted in lower food security.  
8.  Conclusion   
The simulation exercise described in this paper was an attempt to answer
the question: "What was the optimal sequencing of agricultural market reforms in
Malawi."  The results of our simple profit maximization model show that in the
1980's, by reducing the fertilizer subsidy, promoting export crop production, and
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neglecting the main food commodity, producers' welfare in Malawi declined. 
Due to the many constraints that smallholders face, an increase in the price of
groundnuts induced farmers to switch away from maize production which is not
very desirable because imported maize is much more expensive given the
geographical location of the country.  In a country like Malawi with severe land
constraints, limited technology and access to other agricultural services, and
where farmers are still subsistence producers, it becomes very important to
increase the productivity of the staple food crop through the use of improved
seed varieties and fertilizers before cash crop and input prices are liberalized. 
To give the incentives to increase production without reducing the demand for
appropriate input technology and preventing short-term losses for food insecure
farmers, output prices of the main commodity should be liberalized first, followed
by  cash crop prices, and then once a supply response has been initiated, input
subsidies can be gradually phased out, allowing the farmer to base the choice of
his input mix on non-distorted output prices. 
The results of this study provide many implications for other countries
undergoing similar types of  market reforms.  Sequencing is especially important
for low-income countries where the poor usually shoulder most of the short-run
costs of adjustment.  For future work, a good exercise would be to look at two
countries with similar levels of development and agricultural policies and
compare the successfulness of the different sequencing paths they have
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adopted to reform their agricultural sector.  One can also compare countries with
the same sequencing of reforms, but different institutions, infrastructure, and
other structural conditions to determine whether these factors matter.  This is
important because, analysis has shown time and again, that sequencing of price
reform is neither sufficient nor sustainable to generate a supply response.
Unless price reform is accompanied also by reform in the institutional structure
of the agricultural sector such as reform in property rights over land, legal
reform, development of market institutions, ready access to credit, timely
delivery of inputs, adoption of appropriate technology, and build-up of adequate
infrastructure, then market reform will not be successful.
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Table A.  Data Series on Production, Input Use, and Prices, Malawi, 1967-93
Year Production in Input use Current prices in tambala/kg Real prices in tambala/kg Area under
000 mt Maize and Gnut
(000 ha)Maize Gnut Fertilizer (000 mt) Ag. Maize Gnut Fertilizer Wages Maize Gnut Fertilizer Wages
labor(000)
1967 1270 19 9.83 42.2 2.00 9.00 2.10 27.67 2.50 11.25 2.63 34.11 1278
1968 1090 17 9.91 48.3 2.00 9.00 2.23 28.33 2.22 10.00 2.48 31.05 1298
1969 1060 18 15.56 53.7 2.00 9.00 2.38 27.00 2.22 10.00 2.64 29.59 1223
1970 900 15 20.73 57.4 3.00 9.00 2.44 29.33 3.00 9.00 2.44 28.93 1297
1971 1240 22 24.83 63.7 3.00 9.00 3.06 30.67 2.73 8.18 2.78 27.50 1347
1972 1310 22 24.05 70.3 3.00 9.00 3.06 31.67 2.73 8.18 2.78 28.39 1389
1973 1280 18 31.74 80.4 3.00 11.00 3.06 32.00 2.50 9.17 2.55 26.30 1349
1974 1280 17 14.81 93.0 3.00 13.00 3.06 36.00 2.14 9.29 2.18 25.36 1239
1975 1000 17 22.35 103.9 4.00 14.00 7.44 35.33 2.50 8.75 4.65 21.78 1239
1976 1090 17 30.47 154.7 5.00 15.00 6.11 37.33 3.13 9.38 3.82 23.01 1250
1977 1320 17 44.36 168.9 5.00 15.00 6.11 41.00 2.94 8.82 3.59 23.79 1400
1978 1420 17 43.94 182.3 5.00 18.00 6.11 48.00 2.63 9.47 3.22 24.92 1411
1979 1390 17 43.85 181.1 5.00 20.00 6.11 48.33 2.38 9.52 2.91 22.70 1220
1980 1170 18 49.14 157.2 6.60 20.00 6.11 53.00 2.75 8.33 2.55 21.78 1350
1981 1250 18 57.20 158.1 6.60 20.00 7.22 62.67 2.44 7.41 2.67 22.89 1450
1982 1420 54 41.74 197.2 11.10 20.00 10.00 82.33 3.70 6.67 3.33 27.07 1315
1983 1370 55 63.25 177.7 11.10 20.00 11.67 73.67 3.26 5.88 3.43 21.37 1319
1984 1398 55 65.79 189.3 12.20 34.00 13.13 79.00 3.02 8.42 3.30 19.30 1281
1985 1350 62 84.78 190.6 12.20 45.00 15.00 88.00 2.74 10.10 3.37 19.47 1369
1986 1290 88 64.74 185.1 12.20 50.00 19.44 88.00 2.40 9.83 3.82 17.06 1392
1987 1200 88 81.81 179.8 12.20 58.00 20.00 96.67 1.92 9.11 3.14 14.97 1388
1988 1420 72 94.47 197.8 16.60 58.00 25.56 101.67 1.95 6.80 3.00 11.76 1411
1989 1510 35 111.88 214.1 24.00 63.00 18.89 110.33 2.50 6.57 1.97 11.35 1392
1990 1342 19 102.20 229.3 26.00 77.00 36.67 130.33 2.43 7.18 3.42 9.99 1434
1991 1589 31 104.44 237.3 27.00 85.00 42.23 111.20 2.23 7.02 3.49 9.19 1388
1992 657 12 110.08 245.3 30.00 94.00 46.62 124.17 2.01 6.35 3.15 8.39 1179
1993 1999 38 127.69 253.3 43.00 105.00 63.01 134.34 2.43 5.93 3.56 7.59 1340
